U.S. Realty 86 Associates, a New Jersey general partnership v. Security Investment, LTD., a Utah limited partnership, William K. Olson; an individual, and Barbara L. Olson, an individual : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
U.S. Realty 86 Associates, a New Jersey general
partnership v. Security Investment, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, William K. Olson; an
individual, and Barbara L. Olson, an individual :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Young, Adams and Hoffman, LLP; John L. Young; Jeremy H. Hoffman; Lasser Hochman, LLC;
Sheppard A. Guryan; Bruce A. Snyder; Hatch & James, P.C.; Brent O. Hatch; Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellants.
Fadel Associates; George K. Fadel; Attorney for Defendants/Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, US Realty 86 Associates v. Security Investment, LTD, No. 20000450.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/474
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, WILLIAM K. OLSON; an individual, 
and BARBARA L. OLSON, an individual, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Supreme Court No. 
20000450-SC 
(Subject to Assignment to the 
Court of Appeals) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES Priority No. 15 
Appeal from Judgment of Second District Court, Davis County 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin Presiding 
FADEL ASSOCIATES 
George K. Fadel (1027) 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84040 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/ 
APPELLEES 
YOUNG, ADAMS & HOFFMAN, LLP 
John L.Young (3591) 
Jeremy H. Hoffman (5290) 
170 South Main, Suite 1025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1654 
LASSER HOCHMAN, LLC 
Sheppard A. Guryan 
Bruce A. Snyder 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
75 Eisenhower Parkway 
Roseland, New Jersey 07068-1694 
HATCH & JAMES, P.C 
Brent O. Hatch (5715) 
Ten West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
F I L E D ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS 
OCT 2C> 
CLERK SUPREME C0UR1 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SECURITY PNVESTMENT, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, WILLIAM K. OLSON; an individual, 
and BARBARA L. OLSON, an individual, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Supreme Court No. 
20000450-SC 
(Subject to Assignment to the 
Court of Appeals) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal from Judgment of Second District Court, Davis County 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin Presiding 
FADEL ASSOCIATES 
George K. Fadel (1027) 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84040 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/ 
APPELLEES 
YOUNG, ADAMS & HOFFMAN, LLP 
John L.Young (3591) 
Jeremy H. Hoffman (5290) 
170 South Main, Suite 1025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1654 
LASSER HOCHMAN, LLC 
Sheppard A. Guryan 
Bruce A. Snyder 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
75 Eisenhower Parkway 
Roseland, New Jersey 07068-1694 
HATCH & JAMES, P.C 
Brent O. Hatch (5715) 
Ten West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND RULES 
PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE ADDENDUM 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the case, Course of proceedings and Disposition 
by Trial Court. 3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE LAW REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH 
TERMS OF THE LEASES FOR EXERCISE OF 
THE OPTIONS. 9 
POINT II. NO WAIVER. 32 
POINT III. U.S. REALTY FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE. 32 
CONCLUSION 34 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Despain v. Despain. 
855 P.2d 255 (Utah. App. 1993) 
Coombs v. Ouzounian. 
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 357 (1970) . 
Dunphy v. Ryan. 
6 S.Ct. 486, 29 Led 703, 116 U.S. 491 
Geisdorf v. Doughty. 
972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) 
Host Intern. Inc. v. Summa Corp.. 
583 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1973) 
I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Beret. 
32 Utah 454,91 P.2d 279 (1907) 
Jeffv. Stubbs. 
970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). . 
Mills v. Brody. 
929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). 
Pacific Metals Co. v. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co.. 
446 P.2d 303, Utah 2d 400 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 
776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) 
Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co.. 
899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) 
ii 
Young v. Young. 
979 P.2d 338 (Utah 1999) 2 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)0(1996) 1 
in 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, WILLIAM K. OLSON; an individual, 
and BARBARA L. OLSON, an individual, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). This is an appeal from the final 
Judgment of the Utah Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin presiding, over which the Utah Court of Appeals 
does not have original jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Is Appellant, U.S. Realty 86 Associates ("U.S. Realty"), entitled to 
1 
Supreme Court No. 
20000450-SC 
equitable relief excusing its failure to strictly comply with the option exercise notice 
provisions of the subject Ground Leases based on undisputed evidence established 
that the delay in giving notice was at least fifty (50) days late as found by the trial 
court (R 521). 
This issue is a question requiring the application of law to essentially 
undisputed facts. The trial court's conclusions to the legal effect of a given set of 
facts are reviewed for correctness. Jeff v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 
1998). 
2. Did the trial court properly find and conclude that there was no basis for 
granting equitable relief from strict compliance. 
The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). The Court sets aside 
findings of act in actions of equity or law only if they are clearly erroneous. Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
3. Is a finding of gross negligence of an attorney, a certified public 
accountant and managing partners necessary to preclude equitable relief from strict 
compliance with option contracts. 
Based upon the undisputed facts this is an issue of law reviewed for 
correctness. Jeff, 970 P.2d at 1244. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY AND RULES 
AND PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE ADDENDUM. 
There are none. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court. 
Appellees, Security Investment, Ltd., William K. Olson, and Barbara L. 
Olson ("Security Investment/Olsons"), served written notice upon U.S. Realty that 
they would not recognize U.S. Realty's attempt to exercise options to renew land 
leases because the attempt was not timely. U.S. Realty filed a Complaint for 
declaratory judgment/specific performance alleging also as grounds estoppel, 
waiver, breach of implied covenant of good faith, and injunctive relief. 
Security Investment/Olsons moved for dismissal citing Geisdorf v. Doughty. 
972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) as being authority for dismissal of all U.S. Realty's 
claims. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted a temporary 
injunction allowing U.S. Realty to remain in possession pending trial. 
The cause was tried without a jury, and the trial court, Honorable Michael G. 
Allphin, issued a fourteen page Memorandum Decision concluding that U.S. Realty 
was not entitled to the equitable relief sought and that U.S. Realty is to surrender 
possession of the property to Security Investment/Olson, immediately with Security 
3 
Investment/Olson being entitled to the net rents deposited with the clerk during the 
period of the temporary injunctions ( R 517-530). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Security Investment/Olsons adopt the trial courts detailed Findings of Fact as 
being the statement of relevant facts on appeal ( R 518-522) as amplified by 
Conclusions of Law ( R 522-530). 
The relevant facts pertaining to the issue for review as found by the trial 
court are summarized with references to the record. 
Mark Andrew Hoffman ("Hoffman") was employed by U.S. Realty, a New 
Jersey general partnership having 12 shopping centers, as an asset manager (Tr 17). 
Hoffman is an attorney who worked for a law firm for three years prior to his 
employment with U.S. Realty in 1995 (Tr 16, 103). His duties included 
maintenance obligations, reviewing account records and leasing issues (Tr 18). 
Working under Hoffman is Phil Schiffman who was to be responsible for keeping 
track of pertinent dead lines, lease options, payments that needed to be made and 
tax obligations (Tr 19). Prior to Hoffman's employment in 1995, the shopping 
center management, including Woods Cross, Utah, was conducted by Jacob 
Burstyn (Tr 20), working for Winding Brook Corporation which is a partner of U.S. 
Realty (Tr 172). Phil Schiffman received an MBA in accounting from Fairley 
4 
Dickenson University in 1982. (Tr 158). 
Hoffman testified that the primary reason he did not exercise the option 
within the 150 days advance written notice, was the fact that it was not included in 
the abstract which Phil Schiffman had the responsibility to prepare. (Tr 107). 
Hoffman began discussions with representatives of K-Mart, a sublessee of the 
largest building in the Woods Cross Shopping Center, early in 1998 (Tr 108) and 
was advised that the representative of K-Mart would recommend that K-Mart 
exercise its option to renew its lease, but that the corporate office would have to 
make the final decision (Tr 109). Hoffman knew that K-Mart was required to 
provide six (6) moths notice prior to their lease expiration date of November 30, 
1998, which information was provided by Schiffman (Tr 110) and was included in 
their abstract. However, these discussions and information did not "raise a flag" or 
call his attention to the notice requirement in connection with the ground leases (Tr 
111). Hoffman testified his duties with U.S. Realty were only to manage their 12 
shopping centers, and that he had access to the leases but did not undertake to 
determine the length of term and the options, because "there was no need to." (Tr 
113). Schiffman told Hoffman that he, Schiffman, had reviewed the leases and had 
given Hoffman the essential information from the standpoint of getting the abstracts 
in order, keeping track of appropriate deadlines and pertinent times for executing 
5 
duties (Tr 114). 
On November 1, 1996, Hoffman received a notice from Joel Nelson who 
represented UDOT, which notice is Exhibit 3, the next to the last paragraph of 
which states: 
The current lease expires August 1, 1998. If the option to renew the lease is 
exercised, the new rent I understand will be $20,000 a month. The reduced 
rent $2,2182 adjustment would be $18,217 (Tr 122). 
(The ground lease rental was yearly, not monthly.) 
Hoffinan testified that he read the Nelson letter but focused his attention on aspects 
pertaining to the offer for compensation, and that was the extent of his review of the 
letter (TR 123). 
Exhibit No. 8 is a letter from Assistant Attorney General Leland D. Ford to 
Attorney Harold A. Hintze who represented U.S. Realty in the condemnation 
proceedings. The letter is dated January 22, 1998, and the first paragraph reads: 
I received a copy of a Lease from William K. Olson and Barbara L. Olson to 
C & W Manhattan Associates, who I assume is your client's predecessor in 
interest. This lease is dated the 17th day of August, 1972, and is apparently 
due for renewal later this year. 
Hoffman testified that he received a copy of the said letter from Attorney Hintze 
and read the letter but that the above quoted portion did "not come to mind." (Tr 
124). 
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He testified that the first occasion that he actually reviewed Paragraph 22c of 
the lease relating to written notice required to exercise the option was on April 17, 
1998 (Tr 64), and having determined that written notice should have been given 
150 days prior to August 1, 1998, he went to see Schiffman who responded that he 
was not aware of any need to send a formal written notice to exercise an option and 
that it was not in his abstract (Tr 65). Subsequent to this conversation with 
Schiffinan, he went to see the partners within U.S. Realty and explained the need 
for notice of exercising the option, "and everybody was surprised that we had to 
provide a written, formal notice - that we were going to do that. And we simply 
decided to send the notice, exercise the option, because that was always our intent 
in staying on the property." (TR 69). 
On cross examination, Hoffman responded to questions as follows: 
Q. And did I understand your previous testimony that you were shocked on 
April 17 to learn that you had to give 150 days notice? 
A. I was shocked to learn that we were required to provide a written notice 
that I hadn't been advised of prior to this time. 
Q. Okay. On what day did you feel shocked? 
A. The day that I received - that I looked at the lease paragraph and saw that 
a written notice was required by a certain date prior to the lease expiration which I 
had calculated. 
Q. Why didn't you relate that shock or transmit it to Olsons and Security 
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Investment saying, I'm shocked to learn that we didn't give you the notice, instead 
of saying, This will confirm that we exercise the option? 
A. I simply wrote a letter that would exercise the option as the lease 
paragraph suggested that we were obligated to do. We had to send a letter. So I 
simply sent the letter. 
Q. But you were ignoring the time frame? 
A. I didn't indicate -
Q. Did you know at the time that you weren't within the 150 days - that you 
weren't giving them at least 150 days notice? 
A. I had noticed the -1 did do a rough calculation going back from the lease 
expiration date once I saw this paragraph as to the exact date that was 150 days 
prior to the lease expiration and, therefore, felt that it was appropriate to send the 
letter out right away (Tr 137). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly concluded that Utah law requires strict 
compliance with the option terms of the lease citing Geisdorf v. Doughty. 972 P.2d 
67, 70-71 (Utah 1998); and that it is undisputed that U.S. Realty failed to comply 
with the option terms of the two leases in issue here. 
2. The failure of U.S. Realty to timely and properly exercise the options is 
not such "instance" as mentioned in Geisdorf which deviation from strict 
compliance may be equitably excused. 
3. There was no waiver of strict compliance by Security Investment/Olsons, 
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either express or implied. 
4. U.S. Realty has not effectively marshalled the evidence to successfully 
attack the correctness of the trial court's findings of fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
LAW REQUIRING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH TERMS OF 
THE LEASES FOR EXERCISE OF THE OPTIONS. 
U.S. Realty acknowledges that the Utah Supreme Court in Geisdorfv. 
Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 70-74 (Utah 1998) held that barring special circumstances 
such as misrepresentation or waiver, exercise of an option must be made strictly in 
accordance with its terms. 
U.S. Realty does not allege or argue the existence of misrepresentation and 
relies upon arguments relating to implied waiver and equitable excuse from strict 
compliance. The Memorandum Decision of the trial Court beginning on page 10 
thereof ( R 526) cited Geisdorfin concluding there was no waiver, either express or 
implied. Silence of Security/Olsons did not demonstrate implied waiver, nor did 
discussions of rent reduction during the option periods demonstrate that 
Security/Olsons intended to waive their rights to timely notice. As stated by the 
court: "Furthermore, the Court notes that the negotiation between the parties is not 
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what caused plaintiff to fail to provide timely notice. Rather the sole cause of the 
plaintiffs failure to provide timely notice was the failure of Mark Hoffman and Phil 
Schiffinan to read the leases" ( R 528). Also Hoffinan testified that the primary 
reason he did not exercise the option within the 150 days advance written notice 
was the fact that it was not included in the abstract which Phil Schiffinan had the 
responsibility to prepare (Tr 107). As reviewed in the Statement of Facts, supra, 
Hoffinan, Schiffinan and Attorney Hintze had access to the written leases, read 
parts thereof, but did not focus on the requirements for timely written notice. 
While the Supreme Court in Geisdorf made reference to some instances in 
which strict compliance may be equitably excused, the Court concluded at page 74, 
that the rule of law requires strict compliance barring "special circumstances such 
as misrepresentation or waiver", which appears to exclude other kinds of excuses. 
In Geisdorf this court painstakingly detailed the many reasons for requiring 
strict compliance with option provisions, or requiring a distinct intent in any 
claimed waiver, to minimize cases which create fact situations which are needless 
problems to the trier of fact. The Court's reflection in Geisdorf thai "Indeed, there 
are instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused," 
is obiter dicta, in that the statement is not necessary to support the courts decision. 
Id.at 71. In fact, the court did not list economic loss as an excuse for not strictly 
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complying with option terms, nor do the cases the court cites. See id. at 71. The 
court, by reversing the judgment on the verdict in favor of Doughty and against 
Geisdorf, in effect, found that substantial compliance was not offered by Geisdorf 
or accepted by Doughty under exigent circumstances beyond the parties' control; 
and that Geisdorf s conduct was due to willful or gross negligence and was not the 
result of honest and justifiable mistake. 
Geisdorf relied upon several facts to excuse his non-compliance. First, the 
parties had a good, cordial relationship. Second, difficulties were routinely handled 
in informal meetings. In an informal meeting in January 1995, Doughty offered a 
tentative payment plan for the coming year. The lease would expire August 31, 
1995 and the required four month notice under the option would have to be 
exercised by May 1, 1995. Geisdorf had given no written notice July 15, 1995 
whereupon Doughty served a letter requiring renegotiations. Third, by letter dated 
July 24, 1995, Geisdorf replied "This is in response to your letter regarding renewal 
of the lease on 'The Family Jewels' . . . please use this as a confirmation of my 
verbal intention to renew the lease as per the original agreement." Id. at 68. 
Fourth, Geisdorf remained in possession and in October, November, and December 
of 1985, he deposited rent payments to Doughty's closed bank account which the 
bank mistakenly accepted and later returned to Geisdorf. Fifth, in February 1996, 
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Geisdorf complained of a water leak which caused damage and Doughty refused to 
repair the interior but removed ice from the roof Finally, Geisdorf testified there 
was no express waiver, but maintained that after signing the Lease Agreement, 
Doughty never requested that he exercise the option in writing and that the jury 
could have inferred from Doughty's conduct and surrounding circumstances that 
Doughty more likely than not intended to relinquish her right to receive written 
notice. Id. at 72. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that mere silence is not a waiver unless there 
is some duty or obligation to speak. Furthermore, the court discounted Geisdorf s 
attempts to make much of the fact that Doughty did not request before her letter of 
July 15, 1995, a written notice of intent to renew, stating that Doughty had no duty 
to remind Geisdorf, since he was responsible to keep himself informed about the 
continuing lease provisions to protect current and future interests. Id. at 73. 
Geisdorf testified he had forgotten that the notice needed to be in writing, and never 
even considered exercising the option in writing. The court held that he did not 
inform himself, could not assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a 
defense, and that none of the seven specific events imply a waiver, particularly that 
Doughty knew or believed Geisdorf would exercise the option to renew. Id. The 
court then cited I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets. 32 Utah 
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454, 468, 91 P.2d 279, 283 (1907) stating that the Utah Supreme Court had 
previously held that a mere intention to make a request for a new lease was not 
sufficient and that a lessor's knowledge of that intent is not a sufficient basis for 
relief. In Berets, the court found no equity in the facts pleaded in the case. Id. at 
467-468. Accordingly, the Geisdorf court followed the Berets rule in denying 
equitable relief to Geisdorf. 
Geisdorf presented more reasons to be awarded equitable relief than U.S. 
Realty in this case has advanced. The Supreme Court's ruling that Geisdorf was 
not entitled to equitable relief is also an indication that neither Geisdorf nor U.S. 
Realty in this case would be fact situations qualifying under the obiter dicta to be 
equitably excused. In fact, no Utah case mentions forfeiture or loss of future 
earning as being a basis for equitable relief. The Geisdorf court ruled out all other 
matters which could avoid strict compliance by its Conclusion which limits relief to 
special circumstances such as misrepresentation or waiver, stating: 
We uphold the rule of law that barring special circumstances such as 
misrepresentation or waiver, exercise of an option must be made strictly in 
accordance with its terms. 
Geisdorf. 972 P.2d at 74. Geisdorf had operated the business for three years and 
wanted to take advantage of the first of his two five-year options to carry on his 
business which was important enough for him to pursue his claim to future business 
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opportunities through to the Utah Supreme Court. Geisdorf s forfeiture of his 
business through his negligence is more deserving of equitable relief than is U.S. 
Realty's forfeiture of one of its many shopping center leases, which did not involve 
personal effort in creating and expanding business and good will but was in may 
respects a passive source of income. 
Similarly, in Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454 (1907), the 
Installment House had occupied the building for a furniture business and wanted to 
exercise its option after two years, for another three years; but having been two 
days late, on December 3, 1906, it had no equitable remedy even though in the 
month before expiration, November 1906, it had made $750.00 in improvements (in 
1906 money), and had established a business and good will. It is unlikely that the 
Utah Supreme Court, after its detailed discussion of the necessity of compliance 
with option provisions should regard the claims of U.S. Realty as having any merit, 
and likely should consider the claims as being frivolous under the Geisdorf 
precedent. 
That early Utah case of Berets, which has never been modified or overruled, 
supplies an example of that which is inexcusable negligence in failing to timely 
exercise an option. 
The plaintiff/appellant, Installment House, commenced an equitable action 
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for specific performance of an option to renew a two-year lease for a further term of 
three years, upon request of the lessee at the expiration of the term of the lease. 
The Supreme Court, Justice Frick, first held that the option should have been 
exercised on or before the last day of the lease term under the wording of the lease 
which required a request "at the expiration of the term of this lease" (Id. at 466). 
Then, the Court dealt with the issue of equities and held: 
Appellant attempted to avoid the consequences of a late request by setting 
upon some alleged equities. There is, however, no equity in the facts 
pleaded, even if proved just as alleged, that would authorize any court to 
grant the relief prayed for. Courts have no right to disregard any provision so 
of a contact, or to save rights that are lost thereunder through the act of the 
party asking relief, unless it is made to appear that it would be 
unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do, or not to do so. Nothing of that 
kind appears from the pleadings in this case. Appellant pleads nothing that 
would have prevented it from making the request at the proper time except 
mere inadvertence. The concealment attempted to be alleged does not 
amount to such. Appellant's manager knew, and always must have had the 
ready means of knowing, when the old lease expired. This fact could not 
have been concealed from him in view of the allegations of the complaint. 
Appellant, therefore, cannot predicate any right to relief upon this. Nor is the 
fact that at least two of the respondents had knowledge, through 
conversations with appellant's manager, that he intended to request a new 
lease available. A mere intention to make a request was not sufficient. The 
allegations do not go to the extent that respondents in any way prevented 
appellant's manager from making a request. 
Finally it is claimed that the contract should be construed and applied most 
strongly against respondents under the equity rule, which seeks to prevent 
forfeitures, and that the acts of appellant in seeking a renewal should be 
favorably considered in its behalf for the same reason. But the rule 
contended for has no application to the facts in this case. No forfeiture is 
involved. Appellant at most, lost nothing but an opportunity by not 
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performing a condition required of it, which was necessary to the enjoyment 
of a right to an additional term, and which was to be paid for when obtained. 
If a man is invited to attend a sale of his neighbor's property at a certain time, 
and is given the right of bidding for and purchasing it, and fails to attend the 
sale at the hour fixed, he may miss an opportunity, but he forfeits nothing. 
So here, appellant simply lost the right to a renewal of a new term. He 
forfeited nothing in the legal sense that that term is used to respondents. 
Id. at 466 (emphasis added). 
We now review excerpts from the deposition of Mark A. Hoffman taken on 
August 20, 1998, which was published and in part confirmed in testimony at trial, 
and reviewed in the Statement of Facts, supra 5 and 6 . He testified that he is asset 
manager for U.S. Realty (p.3.); which is a New Jersey general partnership having 
only one employee, Hofifinan, in the business owned by the WILF family (p.4). He 
managed the K-Mart ground lease for U.S. Realty since 1995, although U.S. Realty 
acquired the ground lease in 1986 with Robely Management Company managing 
up to 1993 (p.6); and he manages eleven other properties throughout the United 
States for U.S. Realty besides the Wood Cross property as a full time responsibility 
of Hofifinan (p.7). 
An employee of Wilf s, Phil Schiffman, an account/lease administrator has 
some input with respect to managing of leases and preparing "abstracts pertaining 
to all lease documentation" and advises Hofifinan what to do in connection with the 
properties (p.8 and 9). 
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Hoffman learned of the UDOT condemnation in 1996 from a Mr. Nelson 
representing UDOT (p. 11), and prolonged discussions with Nelson regarding 
compensation, leading to UDOT's condemnation proceeding (p. 15). It was not 
until April 1998, that Hoffman advised Nelson that he was satisfied for a reduction 
in rent without further compensation (p.21). Before preparing the April 17, 1998 
letter relating to exercise of the option, Hoffman reviewed the ground lease and 
learned for the first time that written notice was required to exercise the option 
(p.22). He noted that the lease required 150 days and knew that the lease expired 
August 1, 1998 (p.23). He stated that the April 17, 1998 letter "speaks for itself as 
to whether he mentioned that he was late in exercising the option and asking 
permission to acknowledge the exercise of the option, notwithstanding there was 
150 days written notice required (p.24). Phil Schiffman keeps track of expiration 
dates of leases but the Olson and Security Investment leases were not on the 
abstract which Phil Schiffman had responsibility to prepare (p.25). He 
acknowledged that the letter from Nelson dated November 1, 1996, contained the 
sentence, "If the option to renew the lease is exercised, the new rent will be 
$20,400 per month" (p.26). However, he did not focus his attention on the option 
reference, did not discuss the letter with Schiffman and retained the letter in his file 
(p.27). The letter of April 17, 1998 to Olson mentions an annual rental of $12,600 
as specified in the lease (p.28) which makes no mention of an 8% reduction relative 
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to the condemnation. 
On page 29 Hoffman was asked: 
Q. "Would you say that the primary reason why you didn't exercise the 
option within 150 days' advanced written notice was the fact that it wasn't included 
in the abstract which Phil had the responsibility of preparing? 
A. That is correct." 
Hoffman commenced discussions with K-Mart relative to K-Mart's exercise 
of its option either in late 1997 or early 1998, inquiring as to the future of the store 
(p.30), and received information from Bruce VanHorn, K-Mart regional 
representative, that the store was in good shape and he would recommend that K-
Mart "stay there", however, the corporate office makes the final decisions (p.31). 
He had no indication from K-Mart whether they would exercise their option until a 
letter received in May 1998 (p. 32). He knew that K-Mart had to provide U.S. 
Realty six months notice prior to their lease expiration date on November 30th, from 
information provided by Schiffman who had this date in his abstract (p.32). 
Hoffman knew as early as 1995 that the K-Mart lease required six months written 
notice to exercise the option, but this did not raise a flag or call his attention to the 
notice requirement in the ground lease (p.33). He relied upon Schiffman to provide 
him with information on the K-Mart lease termination. Schiffman is an accountant 
or CPA who has been employed by Wilfs since 1992 (p.35). When he asked 
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Schiffinan why the abstract showed the six month notice requirement for the K-
Mart lease but failed to show the notice requirement in the ground lease, the answer 
given by Hoffman was: 
"A. Phil indicated that he - - when he received the leases from the prior 
management company in 1995 he received lease abstracts from the prior 
management company. Those abstracts were incorporated into the computer. Phil 
then went ahead and digested all of the leases in which we were the landlord on the 
property and failed to - - failed to incorporate - - failed to abstract the ground lease 
on the Woods Cross, Utah property (p.37)." 
It appears to be conclusive that from Hoffman's own testimony, he had 
notice from Nelson in November, 1996, of the option exercise provision, knew of 
the K-Mart written notice provision from 1995 and discussions of K-Mart's option 
early in 1998, and made no effort to provide Olson and Security Investment any 
notice until April 17, 1998, some 50 days late, all of which constitutes gross 
negligence. 
Phil Schiffinan testified at trial (Tr 158-175). He testified that a partner of 
U.S. Realty named Winding Brook Corporation was a previous manager who 
mistakenly omitted from the Woods Cross lease the information on option renewal 
dates. Upon cross examination, Schiffman's answers to questions were as follows 
(Tr 172-175): 
"Q. Was Winding Brook a partner at the time it prepared the abstracts? 
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A. From what I understood, one of the owners in Winding Brook was - as 
well- was a partner in U.S. Realty 86. 
Q. So it was a partner of US Realty that made the mistake? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you think that it was the responsibility of Winding Brook to 
include the notice provision in the ground lease in the abstract? 
A. Prior to when Mark Hoffman notified me that it was, I had no idea that it 
was - that it was supposed to be included. 
Q. You assumed that if they did it properly, they would have included the 
notice? 
A. Yes. Well, I assumed whatever I had on that abstract was correct. This 
was the first time I had dealt with a ground lease. 
Q. All right. Now, you said that you had an occasion to review the 
California ground lease? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you noticed that that was self-executing or self-renewal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Automatic renewal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you assume from that that the Kmart ground lease was also 
automatic renewal? 
A. You're talking about the ground lease that's in question? 
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Q. Yes. 
A. I was only notified - it only came to my attention when Mr. Hoffman told 
me that he had questioned if I knew that this was - if I knew that we had to renew it 
and I said I did not know. And then that's when I immediately went to look at the 
other ground lease and see if, in fact, it was, and there was self-renewing. 
Q. So up at that time you were assuming that it might be automatic? 
A. I didn't assume anything. I just assumed that we had to pay -1 looked at 
it as a rent expense. This ground lease was a rent expense and we had to pay it 
once a year, and that's the way I looked at it at the time. 
Q. You did know that Kmart had to give you 180 days written notice to 
renew, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As on the abstract? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that didn't register in your mind that maybe you had an obligation to 
give written notice of renewal? 
A. Not at all, no. 
Q. Did Mark Hoffman tell you that he was negotiating with Kmart with 
respect to a renewal any time after 1997? 
A. He did mention it, but it really didn't - it wasn't applicable to my duties 
so I just - he might have mentioned it, yes, but it wasn't applicable to what my 
duties were. 
Q. Did you have any concern as to whether or not Kmart was going to 
renew its lease? 
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A. No. 
0. So as far as you were concerned, they may or may not have renewed it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. FADEL: I have no other questions." (emphasis added). 
Under the Berets decision, "mere inadvertence" was held to preclude 
avoidance of the consequences of late notice by alleged equities. It is not necessary 
for Security/Olsons to show gross negligence to overcome alleged equities. 
Hoffman and Schiffman were clearly at least grossly negligent professionals. 
The Berets decision was cited and followed by the Supreme Court of Nevada 
in the case of Host Intern. Inc. v. Summa Corp.. 583 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1973). In 
Host the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunction and declaratory relief to 
compel Summa to renew a lease which required 90 days written notice before 
expiration of the original term. Written notice was tendered 42 days late. Host 
contended that Summa waived or was estopped to assert the written notice 
requirement and that special circumstances existed which warranted equitable 
intervention. See id. at 1081. The Court held that neither contention had merit. In 
ruling that no special circumstances exist, the Court stated: 
On the contrary, appellant admitted that timely exercise of written notice was 
simply "overlooked." Equity will not intervene to protect a lessee from its 
own negligent failure to give the required written notice. Medomak Canning 
22 
Co. V. York, supra; I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets. 
32 Utah 454, 91 P.279 (1907). 
Affirmed. 
Id. at 1082. 
To the extent that Geisdorfdoes not conclusively support Security/Olsons' 
position, it is clear that the Supreme Court's decision in Berets supplies a clear 
conclusion that simply overlooking or being negligent in the timely exercise of an 
option does not constitute special circumstances to warrant equitable intervention 
irrespective of the lessee's claim of some possible economic loss. Security/Olsons 
have endured minimal economic gain for 25 years during a time U.S. Realty 
regained their investment plus profits, and it is now proper for Security/Olsons to 
realize some gain and be relieved of burdens of subsequent options. 
Mark Hoffman testified that on April 17, 1998 he became informed of the 
150 day notice requirement and was "shocked" that the information was not on the 
abstract required to be prepared by Schiffinan. Schiffinan also placed the fault with 
the previous partner-manager. An omission which is deemed "shocking" is good 
evidence of gross negligence of the responsible party. Utah partnership law 
provides that a partner is an agent of the partnership as to partnership business 
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(Utah Code Ann. §48-1-6), that a partnership is charged with the knowledge of or 
the notice of a partner (Utah Code Ann. §48-1-9), and that a partnership is bound 
by admissions or representations or a partner (Utah Code Ann. §48-1-8). The 
failure of each of the three professionals to advise themselves of the option 
requirements and to strictly comply is at least gross negligence, and in no way can 
be deemed an honest and justifiable mistake. While ordinary negligence is usually 
not "shocking", gross negligence often is shocking. Unilateral mistake is not 
grounds for equitable relief, and even mutual mistake of fact requires proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. See Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 255, 258 (Ut. App. 
1993). Also, as stated in Pacific Metals Co. v. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co.. 
446 P.2d 303, 21 Utah 2d 400, "It is a general principle that one who commits a 
wrong must take the consequences and cannot complain that someone else doesn't 
rescue him therefrom." Id- Tracy-Collins honored a check of $5,321.70 without 
getting a required second endorsement. Id. At 306. Unilateral mistake is no excuse 
especially where it is not induced by the other party. 
By analogy, equity does not intervene to relieve losses resulting from bar of 
statutes of limitations and statutes of frauds. There are countless cases where 
persons have been precluded from recovering substantial damages for personal 
injuries, contract claims and other causes where there was a failure to commence 
24 
suit within times specified by statute. Equity has not intervened to excuse the 
tardiness and remove the bar in absence of specific tolling provisions, none of 
which are related to sympathy for economic loss. In Dunphy v. Ryan, 6 S.Ct. 486, 
29 Led 703, 116 U.S. 491, the United States Supreme Court specifically denied 
equitable relief from a claim barred by the statute of frauds stating: 
If the mere refusal of a party to perform a parol contract for the sale of lands 
could be construed to be a fraud as would give a court of equity jurisdiction 
to enforce it, the statute of frauds would be rendered vain and nugatory. The 
defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the statute requires such a 
contract as the one he seeks to enforce to be evidenced by writing. That he 
did not exact a contract in writing is his own fault. Courts of equity, are not 
established to relieve parties from the consequences of their own negligence 
or folly. 
Id. at 489. Analogously, Utah cases reject claims for allowing oral contract 
extensions to subvert statute of frauds written requirement. In Mills v. Brody, 929 
P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals cited Coombs v. 
Ouzounian. 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 357 (1970) as holding: 
An option to purchase is an interest in real estate and is within the statute of 
frauds. An extension of a contract which is required to be in writing is not 
enforceable, by majority rule, in the absence of an estoppel, if it does not 
comply with the statute of frauds. 
Mills, 929 P.2d at 364 (quoting Coombs. 465 P.2d at 364). The Mills court 
concluded that "therefore the trial court properly determined that any oral 
modification of the option agreement was void under the statute of frauds." Id. at 
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364. In this case, U.S. Realty is in effect trying to extend the time for exercising the 
option an additional 50 days by assertions that fall short of even being parol 
evidence. 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS STEMMING FROM THE 
SALE OF DEPRECIABLE ASSETS BY THE INVESTORS WHO 
CONSTRUCTED THE IMPROVEMENTS AND 
SOLD TO PREDECESSORS OF U.S. REALTY 
The construction mortgage by C. & W. Manhattan Associates to Larwin 
Realty and Mortgage Trust, dated September 24, 1972, was for the face amount of 
$1,590,000.00 however, construction costs were less so that the permanent 
financing was $1,290,000.00 to Washington National Insurance Company. A 
further mortgage on about two acres of U.S. Security's land was created by W.C. 
Mart Ltd., a 1975 successor to C. & W. Manhattan, on August 11, 1980 in favor of 
Washington National Insurance Company for $435,000.00. Accordingly, C. & W. 
Manhattan had $1,290,000.00 in assets to depreciate between 1973 and 1975. W. 
C. Mart had the same assets to depreciate from 1975 until the 1986 sale to U. S. 
Realty. W.C. Mart had additional assets of $435,000.00 to depreciate from 1980 to 
1986. It is not revealed how much depreciation was taken by C. & W. Manhattan 
and W. C. Mart up to 1986. However, it can be logically assumed they availed 
themselves of that allowed under tax laws. 
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U.S. Realty acquired the improvements October 15, 1986, when the 
combined mortgage balances totaled $1,424,916.00 from the original total of 
$1,725,000.00 ($1,290,000 + $435,000), showing a mortgage reduction of 
$300,084.00. It can be reasonably assumed that rents paid all expenses, and that in 
13 years between 1973 and 1986 held by previous investors, the assets could have 
been substantially depreciated in book value, giving them the benefits of 
depreciation— book losses, for tax purposes. Then in 1986, W.C. Mart sold to 
U.S. Realty for $2,061,300.55 which resulted in a capital gain to W. C. Mart of the 
difference between the depreciated book value and the sales price. From 1986 until 
the end of the lease, U.S. Realty claimed depreciation on its purchase price and 
$2,061,300.31 investment, not on the depreciated book value of W. C. Mart. 
If U.S. Realty were allowed to continue, it could do as W. C. Mart has done, 
sell its depreciated assets to another investor for its claimed market value, and 
realize a capital gain between the depreciated book value and the new sales price. 
Where is the equity? The investors in the depreciated improvements gain upwards 
of $500,000.00 in each resale taking advantage of increased market value whereas, 
the ground lessors received the low rent based on the 1972 market value of the 
land. Equity, if applicable, should divide the gain attributable to market value of the 
respective interests. 
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SPECULATION 
Even if equitable intervention were otherwise indicated, the relief is highly 
speculative even for the term up to the year 2003 when most of the subtenant leases 
would be subject to renewal. Also, any equitable remedy available for the first 
renewed five-year term would be precluded by the legal restriction contained in the 
leases which states that "each option is conditioned upon the exercise of the 
renewal option immediately preceding." Accordingly, damages could not be 
forecast beyond the year 2003. 
U. S. Realty called William L. Christensen, an appraiser, to testify regarding 
an appraisal he made at the request of Mark Hoffman, to estimate the market value 
of the leasehold property as of August 1, 1998. He testified that if the leases were 
going to continue, the value of the leasehold interest would be $1,300,000.00, and 
he recognized that "there is a dispute as to whether the leasehold is going to be 
continued" (Tr 302). Upon cross examination, Christensen acknowledged that the 
land value at that freeway location increased by reason of factors other than the 
existence of the improvements made by the developer (Tr 304). He responded to 
questions as follows (Tr 307): 
"Q. All right. Supposing we go from abstractions to specifics. What 
assurance do you have that Kmart will be satisfied with that location beyond the 
present option period of the five years they exercised that goes to 2003? 
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A. What assurance do I have? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, I don't really need any assurance. You see, an appraiser is really 
nothing more than an observer of what goes on in the market and it seems to be the 
typical thing for tenants and landlords to stick together for a fairly long period of 
time. So the indication to me as a reasonable observer, then, of the market would 
be that it's most probable they would stay there, unless there's some obvious 
reason why they wouldn't. So we would make that assumption just because that's 
what they're doing. 
Q. Are you acquainted with the Bountiful shopping center on Five Points? 
A. Well, I've seen it. I don't know what you mean by acquainted. 
Q. Do you recall that they had anchors of Safeway and Albertson's at one 
time? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). I don't recall particularly, but . . . 
Q. Do you know now that they have the vacancies of those two anchors that 
kind of made the rest of it rather sub value? 
A. I don't really recall looking at it very critically for the last several years, 
so I couldn't really say. 
Q. Did you look at the Ernst location on Pages Lane that has been vacant for 
a number of years? 
A. I've seen it. 
Q. And it still isn't occupied, is it? 
A. I couldn't say for sure. 
Q. Did you look at the Ernst location on 500 South that was vacated a 
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couple of years ago, and do you know whether or not that has been reoccupied? 
A. I don't 
Q. Do you think that would be material in making a determination where 
you say a building that was built in 1972 that had no appreciable improvement to it 
other than repairs and presently needs a roof repair and is only 84,000 square feet, 
that Kmart would remain competitive by occupying that for another 25 years after 
this present option? 
A. Do I think it would? 
Q. Pardon? 
A. Do I think it would remain? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. That was our conclusion, yes. 
Q. That was what? 
A. Our conclusion on the report. 
Q. Well, what did you base the conclusion on? 
A. Well, there were a number of factors. Certainly location is an important 
factor because it's, as you indicated, near the freeway and has wonderful exposure. 
It is functional, even though it may not be as large as some stores. Nevertheless, 
they have other stores that are operating that way. Third thing is that it's - that 
exposure thing give them tremendous highway exposure and probably helps them 
with their marketing. 
Regarding the other centers that you asked me about, we all know that 
Safeways and Ernst had philosophical changes and bankruptcies and so forth which 
caused them to go out of business. That's always a possibility with Shopko or 
anybody else, or Kmart. Anyone can go out of business - there's no questions 
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about that - but the probability is that they will not. And so our job as an appraiser 
is just simply to observe what is going on and to relate our appraisal to what the 
most probable buyer and seller would conclude in their analysis of the property. 
Q. All right. Now, you have emphasized that this is an excellent location by 
reason of its proximity to the freeway and other businesses; is that right? 
A. Yes, I would say it's an excellent location. 
Q. Now, if Kmart required a larger building on the present location, the 
likelihood is that they would declare this one obsolescent, tear it down, and you'd 
had to finance a new improvement? 
A. You mean, you are talking -1 mean, I wouldn't. You're talking about the 
lessor? Is that what you are saying? 
Q. I'm talking about Kmart itself. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. It would have to remain competitive and to do so in this area, they'd have 
to have a bigger and better store. 
A. Well, if you said they had to, and so the assumption is they'd want to do 
that? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. And someone would have to tear it down?" 
U.S. Realty is in no better position than was the lessee in Berets where the 
Court stated: " . . . he may miss an opportunity, but he forfeits nothing. So here, 
appellant simply lost the right to a renewal of a new term. He forfeited nothing in 
the legal sense that that term is used to respondents." 
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One of the tenants, Pizza Hut, had already terminated without exercising its 
option, and that building remains vacant. There is no equitable forfeiture here, even 
if economic loss were important to the issues herein. 
POINT II. NO WAIVER. 
Security/Olsons adopt the trial courts analysis as a full explanation that there 
was no waiver of strict compliance either express or implied. (R 526-529). (pages 
10-13 of Memorandum Decision). (See Appendix). 
POINT III. U.S. REALTY FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE. 
To mount a successful attack upon the correctness of a trial court's findings 
of fact, an appellant must first marshal all of the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding 
even when reviewed in a light most favorable to the court below. In Willard Pease 
Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995), the Court stated "We will 
conclude that a trial court's finding is lacking adequate evidentiary support only if it 
is against the clear weight of the evidence and thus 'clearly erroneous.' In re Estate 
ofBartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a): see Doelle. 784 
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P.2d at 1178; Grayson. 782 P.2d at 470; Reid, 776 P.2d at 899-900." Id. at 773. 
U.S. Realty provided only about two and one-half pages in its brief on "Marshaling 
of the evidence." (App. Br. 35-37). Instead of viewing the evidence of the actions 
and inactions of Hoffman and Schiflman in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings, U.S. Realty endeavors to characterize the neglect as excusable. 
Hoffman, an attorney, whose sole responsibilities were managing leases in 12 
shopping centers, and who claims not to have focused on the lease options even 
after being reminded of the matter of options renewal by the letter of November 1, 
1996 from Joel Nelson of UDOT (Tr 122), and the letter of February 22, 1997 from 
Attorney Ford of UDOT to Hoffman's attorney Hintze, a copy of which was 
provided to Hoffman by Hintze which states, "This lease is dated 17th day of 
August, 1972, and is apparently due for renewal later this year", (Tr 124) was at 
least grossly negligent in failing to read the lease and timely exercise the option. A 
logical inference from the delay in exercising the option is that it may have been a 
calculated delay to determine what K-Mart's intentions were with respect to 
renewal of its lease with U.S. Realty. Hoffman testified that he was "shocked" to 
learn of the 150 day written notice requirement, which further characterizes the 
delays as being a matter of gross negligence on his part, Schiffman's part and the 
previous managing partner's fault. Every one of the three had failed in their duty, if 
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in fact it was U.S. Realty's intention to exercise the option irrespective of K-Mart's 
actions. 
The Model Utah Jury Instructions, 7.44, on duty of care in professional 
negligence cases reads: "In performing professional services for a client, an 
attorney has a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as attorneys of 
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of 
the tasks which they undertake." Hoffman having discussed with K-Mart 
representatives the matter of their exercise of the K-Mart option to renew, should 
have regarded his most important duty as an attorney to determine whether U.S. 
Realty could honor the K-Mart option by its own status. 
Security/Olsons have herein marshaled extensive evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision and judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and the 
matter remanded to the District Court for implementation of the Judgment. 
DATED t h i s j ^ d a y of October, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A George K.Fadel 
Attorney for Security/Olsons Appellees 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES, 
a New Jersey general partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, WILLIAM K. OLSON, 
an individual, and BARBARA L. OLSON, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 980700324 
This matter was tried to the Court on February 23 & 24, 2000. Following the trial the 
Court asked the parties to submit post-trial briefs on three legal issues, which the Court will 
discuss below. The parties submitted their post-trial briefs, and oral argument was had before the 
Court on March 28, 2000. The matter is now ripe for decision. The Court has considered the 
facts, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law. Being folly informed, the Court makes 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that the following undisputed material facts support its conclusions of 
law: 
1. The defendants are the owners of the property that is the subject of the leases at issue in this 
case.1 
2. The defendants entered into leases in 1972 with plaintiffs predecessors in interest. Pursuant 
to those leases defendants leased the undeveloped real property to plaintiffs predecessors in 
interest. The leases were for a term of 25 years with additional five year options for extension of 
the leases. The 25 year term was to begin on August 1, 1973. 
3. After the lease term began, plaintiffs predecessors in interest mortgaged the property in 
order to build the Woods Cross K-Mart Center (the UK-Mart Center"). Defendants subordinated 
their interests in the real property to the mortgages to facilitate the development of the property. 
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest have paid the mortgage payments since that time. 
However, the parties agree that if plaintifTis unable to exercise the option at issue heie, 
defendants will take over the mortgage payments from the time the lease terminated until they are 
paid in full. 
4. Plaintiff obtained the leasehold estates from its predecessors in interest on October 15, 1986. 
Plaintiff paid rent to the defendants from that date until the end of the 25 year lease term, on July 
31, 1998. 
1
 Part of the land in question is owned by Security Investment, LTD., and part of the land is 
owned by defendants Olson. One of the leases is between plaintiff and Security Investment, 
LTD., and the other is between plaintiff and defendants Olson. For the purposes of the Court's 
analysis, the terms of the leases are identical in all respects. 
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5. Under the lease agreements between plaintiff and defendants, there was an initial option to 
extend the lease term for five years after the expiration of the initial lease term. If that initial 
option was exercised, plaintiff was entitled to five successive options to extend the lease term, 
each for a term of five years. The options were to be exercised by plaintiff as follows: "All 
options herein granted shall be exercised by notice in writing to Landlord given not later than 150 
days prior to the expiration of the then-existing lease term . . . ." Thus, plaintiff should have given 
written notice to defendants of their intent to exercise the option no later than March 3, 1998. 
6. In October of 1995, direct management of the K-Mart Center was transferred from Winding 
Brook Co. to Garden Homes Group. Garden Homes Group employed an attorney, Mark 
Hoffman, as the company's asset manager. An accountant for Garden Homes Group, Phil 
Schiffman, worked closely with Mark Hoffman in managing the company's assets. 
7. Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman obtained the files and records for the K-Mart Center from 
Winding Brook Co. after the transfer. These included the leases in question here, as well as an 
abstract of pertinent data from the leases that was compiled by Winding Brook Co.. The abstract 
was used by Hoffman and Schiffman in their day-to-day management of the K-Mart Center (and 
other properties). Hoffman relied upon Schiffman to provide him with notice of dates requiring 
affirmative actions on the part of plaintiff under the leases. Schiffman derived a tickler system 
from the abstract to alert Hoffman and Schiffman of important dates and deadlines. Hoffman and 
Schiffman relied on the information in the abstract without comparing it to actual lease terms to 
verify its accuracy. They presumed that the abstract was accurate because it was prepared by one 
of the partner's in plaintiffs company. 
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8. In 1996 the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") notified the parties of its 
intention to condemn a part of the property in question for construction of an access road to 
Interstate 15. At that time Mark Hoffman reviewed part of the leases, to determine what 
plaintiffs rights were upon condemnation. 
9. On or about November 1, 1996 a letter was sent to Mark Hoffman by Joel R. Nelson. The 
letter was concerning K-Mart's need for a reduction in rent because of the amount of property to 
be condemned by UDOT. However, the letter contained a paragraph that put Mark Hoffman on 
notice of the need to look into the terms for the exercise of the option. The letter states: "The 
current lease expires August 1, 1998. If the option to renew the lease is exercised the new rent I 
understand will be $20,400/month " 
10. UDOT filed the condemnation action against the property in March of 1997. There was a 
dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants as to whether or not plaintiff should receive part 
of the condemnation proceeds. The parties discussed the possibility of reducing plaintiffs rent 
during the option periods if plaintiff would agree to disclaim any interest in the condemnation 
proceeds. 
11. On or about April 17, 1998 Mark Hoffman reviewed the terms of the leases to ascertain 
how the rents should be reduced during the option periods. At that time Mark Hoffman 
discovered that the terms of the leases required plaintiff to give 150 days written notice prior to 
the end of the lease to exercise the option to renew the leases. This caused Mark Hoffman and 
Phil Schiffman to check the tickler system and the abstract, to see if the option deadline was in 
those documents. The option deadline was not mentioned in either document. Plaintiff alleges, 
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and there is no evidence to the contrary, that this is the only material error found to date in the 
tickler system and abstract. 
12. On April 17, 1998 Mark Hoffman sent notices to defendants of plaintiff s intent to exercise 
its options. The notices were received by the defendants on April 22, 1998. Thus, the notice 
provided by plaintiff was at least 50 days late, as the leases required that the notice be sent no 
later than 150 days prior to the end of the lease term. As mentioned above, March 3, 1998 was 
150 days prior to the end of the lease terms. 
13. Between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 plaintiff and defendants were in agreement as to 
how they should settle their dispute over the proceeds from the condemnation action. They 
agreed that plaintiff would give up any right to the proceeds, and in return defendants would 
reduce the rents during the future option periods. 
14. At some time between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 defendants requested and plaintiff 
paid for sewer assessments and a slope easement, which brought the property current on these 
items through December 31, 1998, which is approximately five months into the first option 
period. 
15. Between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 the defendants did not take any action to assume 
liabilities, obligations or responsibilities in relation to the property. 
16. On July 15, 1998 defendants Olson sent a letter to plaintiff, informing plaintiff that its 
notice to exercise the option was not effective because it was not timely, and indicating that the 
only way for the relationship to continue between the parties was to renegotiate the rental value 
of the property. 
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17. On July 17, 1998 defendant Security Investment LTD. sent a letter to plaintiff, informing 
plaintiff that its notice to exercise the option was not effective because it was not timely, and 
setting forth terms under which plaintiff could continue to lease the property if it so desired. 
18. On or about December 16, 1998 defendants' attorney served a Notice to Quit upon 
plaintiff, informing them that they were in unlawful detainer of the property, because the options 
had not been validly exercised. 
19. On or about March 4, 1999 plaintiffs filed a formal disclaimer of any right to the 
condemnation proceeds. The disclaimer states that plaintifFs agreement to forego any right to the 
condemnation proceeds was based on defendants' agreement to reduce the rent during the option 
periods. 
20. Plaintiff continues to manage the property and collect rents from the subtenants. Pursuant 
to Court order, plaintiff pays the expenses of managing the property out of the rents paid by the 
subtenants, and submits any net profit to the clerk of the court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There are three legal issues before the Court. The first issue is whether Utah law gives 
trial courts power to grant equitable relief to a lessee who has failed to timely exercise an option 
to extend its lease. The second issue presumes that Utah law provides for such equitable relief, 
and is an inquiry into whether or not the plaintiff has satisfied all of the requirements to avail itself 
of that equitable relief. The third and final issue is whether the conduct of the defendants in this 
case amounts to a waiver of their right to receive timely written notice of plaintifFs intent to 
exercise the options. 
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Before proceeding with its analysis of the three legal issues set forth above, the Court 
notes that Utah law requires strict compliance with the option terms of a lease. Geisdorfv. 
Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to 
strictly comply with the option terms of the two leases at issue here. Thus, plaintiff can only 
obtain relief from its failure to strictly comply with the option terms if there is an equitable remedy 
available. If there is an equitable remedy available, then plaintiff must have satisfied all of the 
requirements to avail itself of the equitable remedy. 
The Court concludes that Utah law does provide an equitable remedy for a lessee who has 
failed to strictly comply with the option terms of a lease. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly 
recognized "that there are instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably 
excused." Geisdorf at 71. Counsel for defendants correctly states in his post-trial brief that the 
Supreme Court did not need to rely on its discussion of equitable relief to deny the plaintiff there 
relief, as he did not request equitable relief. However, the Court does not believe that the 
Supreme Court's discussion of equitable relief in Geisdorf can be dismissed offhand as mere 
obiter dictum. The Supreme Court's discussion of equitable relief was made to explain or even 
justify the application of the strict compliance rule. The Supreme Court recognizes, as have the 
appellate courts of many other states, that in some cases the strict application of a rule of law 
would be inequitable, and that in those cases courts can use their equitable powers to render 
appropriate relief. The statements made by the Supreme Court in Geisdorf were made to give 
trial courts direction on how and when equitable relief should be granted. 
Having concluded that equitable relief is available under Utah law, the Court must 
determine the standard for granting equitable relief. Then the Court must go on to determine 
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whether the facts before the Court are such that plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief. First, a 
lessee "may be excused from strict compliance . . . when the [lessee's] 'conduct in failing to 
comply was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the [lessee] but was rather the 
result of an honest and justifiable mistake.'" Geisdorf at 71 (quoting Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. 
Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. App. 1977)). While the Utah Supreme Court did not further 
develop the equitable relief standard, other courts have determined that if a lessee has failed to 
strictly comply with the option terms of a lease because of mere negligence, the court should not 
automatically grant equitable relief. Rather, the court must further analyze the facts of the case 
and grant relief only where: 1) the delay in providing written notice has been slight; 2) the loss to 
the lessor is small; and 3) to refuse equitable relief would result in unconscionable hardship to the 
lessee. F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 50 (Conn. 1922). Finally, Geisdorf further 
provides that trial courts can provide equitable relief "'where the strict compliance was prevented 
by some act of the [lessor] such as waiver or misleading representations or conduct.'" Geisdorf at 
71 (quoting Cattle Feeder's. Inc. at 33). 
The first factual determination the Court must make is whether plaintiffs failure to strictly 
comply with the option terms of the lease was due to willful or gross negligence, or whether it 
was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake. At the outset the Court notes that the facts of 
this case make it difficult to simply state that plaintiff was willfully or grossly negligent, or that 
plaintiff was merely negligent. There are no discrete categories of behavior into which plaintiffs 
behavior clearly fits. Rather, there is a continuum between mere negligence and willful or gross 
negligence, and the Court must determine whether plaintiffs conduct is closer to willful or gross 
negligence on that continuum, or whether it is closer to mere negligence. 
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It is axiomatic that negligence is the failure to exercise the standard of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. Cooper v. Evans 262 P.2d 
278, 280 (Utah 1953). Though not specifically defined as such by Utah case law, willful 
negligence has been defined elsewhere as being "voluntary." F.B. Fountain Co. at 49.2 Finally, 
Utah law defines gross negligence as follows:'"Gross negligence is the failure to observe even 
slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the 
consequences that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 709 
P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985)(quoting Robinson Ins. And Real Estate. Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co.. 366 F.Supp. 307, 311 (W.D. Ark. 1973)). The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut 
referred to willful and gross negligence together by using the term "culpable negligence." F.B. 
Fountain Co. at 49. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that the negligence of plaintiffs 
employees, Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman, was closer to willful or gross negligence than it 
was to mere negligence. Both of these individuals are professionals. Mark Hoffman is an 
attorney, and Phil Schiffman is an accountant. They make a living by managing commercial 
properties for the plaintiff. As professionals, they are held to a higher standard than non-
professionals. Thus, while it was convenient for them to rely on the abstract provided to them by 
Winding Brook Company to give them all pertinent information concerning the leases in question, 
it was grossly negligent for them to fail to read the leases to discover how to exercise the options. 
Both Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman were aware of the fact that the 25 year leases would 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the term "willful" "implies something in addition to 
mere negligence." Salas v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 564 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Utah 1977). 
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expire on July 31, 1998. They knew this long before March 3, 1998. Both Hoffman and 
Schiffman knew that there were five-year options available under the leases. They discussed the 
options with the defendants. They negotiated rents for the option periods pursuant to the 
condemnation proceeding. Furthermore, both Hoffman and Schiffman knew or should have 
known that the abstract did not tell them how to exercise their options under the leases. They 
both knew that options had to be exercised according to certain terms, because their subtenants 
exercised options with them. Despite the knowledge Hoffman and Schiffman had of the need to 
find out how to properly exercise the options, neither of them took the time to read the leases to 
obtain this information. Their failure to read the lease until 45 days after the option deadline had 
passed was the primary, if not sole, cause of their failure to provide timely written notice to the 
defendants. The Court cannot in good conscience conclude that the failure of two professionals 
to read their leases is mere negligence. Rather, the Court concludes that their failure to read the 
leases was failure to exercise even slight care. It was carelessness that shows utter indifference to 
the consequences that resulted. Plaintiffs employees were grossly negligent, and equity will not 
intervene to rescue them from their culpable negligence. 
The final issue the Court must address is whether the conduct of the defendants amounts 
to a waiver of their right to notice according to the express terms of the lease. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Geisdorf clarified the standard for waiver in these cases. "A waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right... a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Geisdorf at 72. Furthermore, trial 
courts are to "assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is 
clearly intended. Any waiver must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." Id. 
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Finally, where the alleged waiver is merely to be implied, trial courts are "to be especially careful 
in their examination of the evidence. Id. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court first notes that there is no allegation that any of 
the defendants expressly waived their rights to notice under the terms of the leases. Thus, the 
Court must carefully assess the totality of the circumstances to see whether the defendants clearly 
intended to relinquish their rights to notice. 
Plaintiff argues that three facts indicate that the defendants waived their right to timely 
notice. First, the defendants did not object to plaintiffs tardy notice until at least July 15, 1998. 
Apparently it is plaintiffs position that defendant's silence on the issue between April 22, 1998 
and July 15, 1998 amounts to a waiver of the defendants' right to timely notice. Second, the 
defendants negotiated with plaintiff for a reduction in rents during the option periods. The 
implication plaintiff seeks to derive from this is that defendants had implicitly accepted plaintiffs 
tardy notice, and had determined to allow them to exercise the options despite the late notice. 
Finally, on July 8, 1998, defendant Security Investment LTD. asked plaintiff to pay sewer 
assessments up through December 31, 1998, which is five months into the option period. 
Plaintiffs contend that defendant Security Investment LTD. would not have made this request if it 
had intended to enforce the option terms of the lease. Plaintiff argues that these facts, taken 
together, demonstrate that defendants intended to waive their right to timely notice, or is at least 
inconsistent with any other intent. 
In analyzing the facts of this case, the Court notes that "[m]ere silence is not a waiver 
unless there is some duty or obligation to speak." Geisdorfat 72. The parties here were dealing 
with one-another at arms-length, and defendants did not have a duty or obligation to speak to 
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plaintiff immediately upon receipt of the tardy notice. Thus, the fact that defendants were silent 
for almost three months after plaintiff filed its tardy notice cannot be used to demonstrate an 
implied waiver. 
The Court notes that it is difficult to decide whether or not the negotiation of the parties 
as to the reduction of rents during the option periods demonstrates that defendants clearly 
intended to waive their right to timely notice. The Court concludes that this fact does not provide 
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendants clearly intended to waive their right 
to timely notice. When the parties were negotiating the future rent reductions, they were not 
discussing the issue of whether or not plaintiff should have to provide timely notice. Rather, they 
were negotiating a settlement of a long-time dispute between the parties concerning the proceeds 
of a condemnation proceeding. Thus, their discussions cannot be seen as an implied waiver of 
their rights to timely notice. Furthermore, the Court notes that the negotiations between the 
parties is not what caused plaintiff to fail to provide timely notice. Rather, the sole cause of 
plaintiffs failure to provide timely notice was the failure of Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman to 
read the leases. If the parties' negotiations had caused plaintiff to be lulled into false security, and 
thus caused plaintiff to fail to provide timely notice, the equities would weigh more heavily in 
favor of plaintiff. 
Next, the Court concludes that defendant Security Investment, LTD/s request that 
plaintiff pay the sewer assessments through December 31, 1998 is not sufficient to demonstrate a 
clear intent to waive the right to timely notice. It could be seen as a tacit admission that plaintiff 
would still have rights under the leases beyond the original July 31, 1998 termination date. 
However, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the person asking plaintiff to pay the 
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sewer assessment was thinking about the exercise of the options when they made this request. 
Under the terms of the leases plaintiff was required to pay all assessments, taxes etc. Thus, it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that defendant Security Investment, LTD. became aware of an 
assessment that was due, and simply asked plaintiff to pay it. 
When the Court considers all of the facts together, it is not convinced that defendants 
clearly and unambiguously intended to waive their rights to timely notice. There is one weakness 
shared by all of these facts that leads the Court to conclude that defendants did not make a clear 
and unambiguous waiver. There is no evidence that the various defendants knew that they had a 
right to timely notice at the time the various defendants acted or failed to act as alleged by 
plaintiff. For the Court to find waiver, the defendants must have had: 1) a right to timely notice; 
2) knowledge of their right to timely notice; and 3) an intention to relinquish their right to timely 
notice. The Court finds that it is reasonable to conclude from the facts before the Court that the 
defendants did not know of the 150 day notice requirement until their attorney made them aware 
of it on or about July 15, 1998. And even if the facts do not allow the Court to affirmatively 
conclude that the defendants did not know of their right to demand timely notice until on or about 
July 15, 1998, the Court can affirmatively state that there is no evidence that the defendants had 
knowledge of their right to strictly enforce the option provision. Thus, plaintiff cannot obtain 
relief under a waiver theory, because plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants had 
knowledge of their rights under the option clause. 
Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court concludes that 
plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable relief sought. Plaintiff is to surrender possession of the 
property to defendants immediately. All of the funds placed in Court are to be delivered to the 
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defendants. However, any expenditures plaintiff made prior to August 1, 1998, that provide a 
benefit to defendants beyond the termination of the leases, are to be refunded to plaintiff. Counsel 
for defendants is directed to prepare a proposed form of order consistent with the Court's ruling 
and present it to counsel for plaintiff pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated April / / , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
f/JsC^^ 
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YOUNG & HOFFMAN, LLC 
John L.Young (3591) 
Jeremy M. Hoffman (5290) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Boston Building, Suite 900 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 595-1615 
Facsimile: (801) 595-1610 
LASSER HOCHMAN, L.LC. 
Sheppard A. Guryan 
Bruce H. Snyder 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
75 Eisenhower Parkway 
Roseland, New Jersey 07068-1694 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES, a New 
Jersey general partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; WILLIAM K. OLSON; 
an individual, and BARBARA L. OLSON, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
This matter was tried to the Court on February 23 and 24, 2000, the Honorable 
Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff appeared by a management 
representative and its attorneys, Young & Hoffman, LLC, of Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
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SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT | 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 980700324 
Hon. Michael G. Allphin 
Lasser Hochman, L.LC, of Roseland, New Jersey. The defendants appeared by their 
respective management representatives and their attorney, George K. Fadel. The Court 
received evidence in the form of testimony and exhibits, post-trial briefs and heard 
post-trial arguments. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law by Memorandum Decision dated April 11, 2000, enters the following 
Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants are granted judgment on their Counterclaims against 
plaintiff as follows: 
(a) The Ground Leases dated August 17, 1972, between 
defendants and the plaintiff, as successor-in-interest to C & W Manhattan & Associates, 
are hereby adjudged and decreed to have terminated on July 31, 1998, and all rights and 
obligations of the plaintiff under said Leases and in and to the leased premises 
terminated as of July 31, 1998. 
(b) Defendants are entitled to and are hereby granted 
immediate possession of the premises described in the Ground Leases and all 
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the plaintiff. The leased premises are 
described on "Exhibit A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
3. The defendants are ordered to pay as installments are due the 
balances on the Washington National Insurance Company mortgages being serviced by 
Conseco Mortgage Capital, Inc., Mortgage Nos. 0420882 and 0420021, and to continue 
making payments until the mortgages are completely amortized, without recourse or 
claims against plaintiff. 
4. All funds deposited with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 
previous Orders of the Court are to be paid to the defendants upon entry of this 
Judgment. No objections were filed with respect to the accountings for funds deposited 
with the Court and such accountings and deposits are adjudged to comply with the 
previous Order of this Court, and are hereby approved. Defendants shall pay to 
plaintiff the amount, if any, of expenses paid by the plaintiff prior to August 1, 1998, 
which have an accrual benefit to the defendants after July 31, 1998. 
5. No attorneys' fees are awarded to either party. 
6. No pre-judgment interest is awarded. 
7. Defendants are awarded costs to the extent provided for by law. 
ENTERED this /S day of Ml UUA^ 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Michael G. Allp 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of 
f/j. , 2000, true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record, to-wit: 
George K. Fadel, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
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pBOPKKrc D ^ C R I P T I O W 
WILLIAM K. OLSON et ai. 
Beginning at la point 199 feet Worth frcxn the Southeast 
• . i • . / i - i i : • • 
corner o f lot; 9, Sootion 36, Tcwruship 2 North, Range JL Vtest, thenoe 
Soutli 117.60 f e e t iroi'3 ,or l eao t o the Westerly r i g h t of way of the . 
formar USiHR, thence South 26 f ,44 l V7est 68.74 foo t along ad Westerly l ine ; 
tl-vence Westerly 167 .,23 f e e t along a utrolghfc l i n o to" po int of tangent 
w i t h a 609*62 f o o t rcdLial curve t o the l e f ty thence Vtosteirly 1$6«49 
f e o t aDx>ng t h e arc of *aid curv* t o the i n t e r s e c t i o n v i t h Northerly: 
e x i s t i n g r i g h t o f v«y l i n e of 2600 South S tree t ; thenoe WMterly 519# 33 
feet: mora o r l e s s t o the Easter ly U n a of property descr ipt ion by 
470-150; thence North. (}• 43'28" Vtest 125*fe©t; thenoa. Easter ly 53 .21 
f e e t a long the arc of 4 17° f o o t rad ia l curve t o the r i g h t ; thence ••• 
North 17*12'32M East 24.70 f e e t nore o r l e s s t o a po int South 89*44' 
totof -the po int o f beginning; thence North 89*44 \JBast 870.06 f e e t , 
more or
 r l e s s , t o the podLnt. o f beginning. Containing.3.898 a c r e s . 
IWERTY "DESCRIPTION 
SECURITY'INVESTMENT ,LTD 
Beginning 3.11 chains. South and 570.'J/] feet Cast, and 3/12 rods 
f, and East 04.7 feat from-.Northeast corner of Southwest Quarter of 
ion\3G'i Township 2 North, Range 'I West, Salt Lake Meridian; thence 
westerly-W.T feet .along arc of TOO', curve, to left (Mote:, tang,, to 
jrvc at its pt of bfg. bears South 20°51' West); thence East 037.54 
thence North" 6.915 chains; thence West 605.3 feet to beginning. 
BY UDOT CONDEMNATION. 
